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Abstract
In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifi-
cally, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice
the total demand of the optimal outcome. We propose an incentives scheme that promotes optimal
outcomes in the inefficient electricity market. The economic incentives can be seen as an indirect
revelation mechanism that allocates resources using a one-dimensional message space per resource to
be allocated. The mechanism does not request private information from users and is valid for any
concave customer’s valuation function. We propose a distributed implementation of the mechanism
using population games and evaluate the performance of four popular dynamics methods in terms of the
cost to implement the mechanism. We find that the achievement of efficiency in strategic environments
might be achieved at a cost, which is dependent on both the users’ preferences and the dynamic evolution
of the system. Some simulation results illustrate the ideas presented throughout the paper.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid (SG) concept has entailed profound changes in the conception of electricity
systems. Specifically, efficiency in both electricity generation and consumption is one of the
main goals of the SG [1]. One of the main characteristics of the electricity system is that
the technological development might be insufficient by itself to achieve the desired goals [2].
Hence, efficiency is expected to be achieved by means of an active cooperation of consumers
in the electricity systems. Demand response (DR) programs arise as a tool intended to promote
cooperation of consumers with the electricity system. DR programs deal with the problem of
providing economic incentives to consumers in order to modify their electricity consumption
behavior. Incentives proposed in the literature use price mechanisms, by which either higher or
lower consumption is encouraged through changes in the electricity prices. However, the design
of incentives is not a trivial task, because the price scheme might impact the robustness of the
system [3]. Also, incentives must be designed having into account the characteristics of the
consumers, who might be either price takers or price anticipators. On the one hand, a price
taker makes decisions without considering future implications of its decisions. On the other
hand, a price anticipator (or strategic agent in the context of game theory) makes decisions
taking into account the consequences of its actions on the system. Particularly, the behavior of
price anticipators might lead to a degradation of the system’s efficiency, which is known as the
price of anarchy [4], or the tragedy of the commons, when the efficiency loss is accompanied
by an overuse of resources [5]. In this work, we show that the electricity system experiences
the tragedy of the commons, and particularly, we show that the total demand in an inefficient
system is at most twice the total demand in an efficient system (when we consider average cost
pricing). This result complements previous works that investigate the efficiency loss of resource
allocation processes [6]–[10].
The inefficiency of resource allocation processes has inspired the search of schemes that
achieve optimal outcomes. Efficiency in a society of strategic agents might be accomplished
with mechanism design, which addresses the problem of designing the rules of a game to reach the
desired outcome [11], [12]. An outstanding result in mechanism design is the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism (VCG), which is a direct revelation mechanism that guarantees efficient
outcomes in dominant strategies [13]–[15]. The VCG mechanism requests private information
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3from users (such as preferences or payoff functions) and assigns a central agent the tasks
of gather information and compute the optimal resource allocation. In particular, the VCG
mechanism provides incentives to elicit private information, even if users are unwilling to report
their true preferences due to strategic or privacy issues. However, the implementation of the VCG
mechanism might not be practical. For instance, the revelation of private information might affect
correlated activities of users [16] and also might need high amounts of both communication and
computation resources to implement the optimal solutions [12].
A mechanism that allocates resources without private information is the Kelly mechanism [17],
[18]. In this mechanism users send a bid to a central planner who assigns resources following a
proportional fairness criteria. However, there is an efficiency loss if users are strategic [8], which
inspired the design of efficient mechanisms in strategic environments. In [19], an efficient one-
dimensional mechanism based on the Kelly and VCG mechanisms is proposed. On the other
hand, [10] presents a more general mechanism for convex environments in which each user
reports her payoff function. These mechanisms use a one-dimensional message space because
the payoff functions are parametrized by a single parameter.
In this work, we propose a scheme of economic incentives that can be seen as an indirect
revelation mechanism based on the Clarke pivot mechanism [20]. The main feature of our
mechanism is that, unlike the VCG mechanism, it does not require private information from
users. Furthermore, it coordinates the resource allocation process to achieve optimal outcomes
utilizing a one-dimensional message space per each resource to be allocated. Specifically, the
mechanism entrusts the computational tasks among users, who maximize their own surplus
based on the total demand (which in turn is calculated and broadcasted by a central agent).
Thus, users avoid revelation of private information (e.g., preferences), but are required to report
the aggregate consumption of their appliances during some time periods. It is noteworthy that
the mechanism implements efficient outcomes regardless of the form of the valuation function
(as long as it is concave). Nevertheless, this incentives scheme might require external subsidies
to be implemented, which means that the benefit obtained in the optimal outcome is not enough
to fund the incentives scheme.
The optimization problem of each user is seen as a local resource allocation problem, in
which the electric energy is the resource that should be allocated in different time periods. We
extend the work presented previously in [21] by implementing the mechanism using evolutionary
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4dynamics to distribute efficiently the power consumption of each user. Evolutionary dynamics
are built based on myopic learning, which resembles subject’s behavior in repeated games [22],
[23]. With a myopic dynamic it is not necessary to broadcast real time information about the
aggregated demand, because customers update their strategy based on the previous actions.
A. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: 1) we formulate the
demand response problem as a tragedy of the commons dilemma, highlighting that the efficiency
loss takes place with an overuse of resources of at most twice the total demand in an efficient
system. This result can be utilized to prove that the peak to average ratio can be reduced to
a half in an efficient system; 2) we propose a novel scheme of economic incentives for
achieving optimal demand profiles in a population of strategic agents. The mechanism uses a
one-dimensional message space per resource to be allocated, is valid for any concave electricity
valuation function, and satisfies the properties of budget deficit and individual rationality; and
3) we present a distributed implementation of the mechanism using population games, and
we evaluate the performance of four popular evolutionary dynamics, namely logit dynamics,
replicator dynamics, Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, and Smith dynamics in terms of the
cost to implement the mechanism. We highlight that the achievement of efficiency in strategic
environments might be achieved at a cost, which is dependent on both the users’ preferences
and the dynamic evolution of the system.
B. Related Literature
Let us elaborate on some properties of the mechanism and related literature. The structure of
the economic incentives is similar in philosophy to the mechanism in [24]. However, [24] presents
a direct revelation mechanism in which users must communicate their marginal payoff functions.
Hence, the mechanism might need a high-dimensional message space to describe the required
function. Previous works analyze the dependence of the message space with the efficiency of
the mechanism. For instance, [25] analyzes the minimum space required to implement optimal
allocations in exchange economies, which is larger than the number of participants and resources.
Furthermore, [26] shows that one-dimensional message spaces are not suitable to achieve optimal
allocations on contractive games (games whose best response is a contraction mapping). In this
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5work we manage to design a mechanism that uses a one-dimensional space (to allocate a single
resource) due to the properties of the system. Specifically, the wealth of an agent depends on
her own action and the aggregate actions of other agents. Thus, we can decentralize decisions
by sending to each agent the aggregated demand, which is one-dimensional (population games
satisfy the conditions to reduce the message space [27]). Also, we guarantee stability through
the properties of potential games, and consequently, we do not impose the restrictions of [26]
in our work.
Furthermore, works as in [28], [29] propose decentralized mechanisms to allocate efficiently
bandwidth in networks. These mechanisms satisfy the budget balance property, but require a
multidimensional message space, because users must report their desired allocation and the
price they are willing to pay for each link of the network. Our mechanism might not guarantee
the budget balance property, but this shortfall is compensated by the reduction of the message
space.
Our work is closely related to other indirect revelation mechanisms that implement efficient
outcomes with limited information using price incentives [30], [31]. However, our work differs
from [30] in that they minimize the energy cost, while we maximize the aggregate surplus of
the society. Also, in [30] each user has to broadcast the scheduled daily energy consumption to
all other users, while we assume that a central agent broadcast this information to all users. On
the other hand, [31] models the society’s behavior using evolutionary dynamics, which converge
to the optimal solution because the system is modeled as a potential game. A limitation of [31]
is that the payoff functions must be additively separable in the private information of users. In
our work we model the strategy of a customer as the mixed strategy of a population. Thus, an
agent is not limited to a fixed set of strategies (as in [31]), but can choose from a large but finite
set.
This work is inspired in previous applications of mechanism design in efficient resource
allocation problems, notably [7]. In particular, we consider the DR problem as a resource
allocation problem of multiple goods. We depart from other resource allocation approaches such
as [32], in which we do not specify the payoff functions that lead to a desired outcome. Instead,
we design the rules of the game to achieve the desired result without modifying the valuation
function of each agent.
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6C. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section II we introduce the model of the
electricity system and prove that its inefficiency is caused by selfish agents that have incentives
to over-exploit resources. In Section III, we design an indirect revelation mechanism that uses
an incentive scheme to achieve the optimal outcomes in strategic frameworks. In Section IV, we
introduce the distributed implementation of the mechanism. Section V presents some examples to
illustrate the ideas developed throughout the paper. Finally, Section VI presents some conclusions
and future directions.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section we introduce the market model of an electricity system and present two solution
concepts arising in both ideal and strategic environments. Then, we prove the inefficiency of the
electricity system in strategic environments and discuss its consequences in electricity markets.
A. Electricity System Model
We consider an electricity market composed by three parties, namely the generator, the
customers, and the independent system operator (ISO). In this case, a single generator provides
energy to several customers, while the ISO maintains a balance between supply and demand
(market clearing). We define the society as a set with N customers denoted by P = {1, . . . , N}.
We take into account users that might have time varying consumption preferences. These
preferences are associated with their changing necessities of energy along the day. This feature
is modeled by partitioning a day in T time intervals in which users have roughly the same
consumption preferences. In order to make the problem tractable, we assume that the system’s
parameters are independent in each time period and decompose the demand response problem
into T problems. Henceforth we deal with a single subproblem and in Section IV we couple
multiple time periods using the definition of a population game.
We denote the daily consumption of the ith customer with a real number qi ∈ R≥0. Without
loss of generality, we restrict the electricity consumption to zero or positive values, i.e., qi ≥ 0,
for all agents i ∈ P . Likewise, the electricity consumption of the society is denoted by the vector
q = [q1, . . . , qN ]
⊤ ∈ RN≥0 and the vector q−i = [q1, . . . , qi−1, qi+1, . . . , qN ]⊤ ∈ RN−1≥0 represents
the consumption of the society, except for the ith customer.
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and the electricity price. In particular, rational agents might try to maximize their profit, which
is defined as the benefit earned minus the cost associated with the energy consumed. The benefit
might be represented by means of a valuation function vi : R≥0 → R, where vi(qi) represents
the economic value that the ith user assigns to qi electricity units.
In a market economy the consumption is also limited by the cost associated to it. Hence,
besides their valuation of energy, customers also take into account the electricity price to make
consumption decisions. In particular, the cost of the energy is denoted by λ, and consequently,
the profit of the ith consumer can be represented by
Ui(q) = vi(qi)− qiλ. (1)
We assume that the generation is coordinated by the ISO in order to guarantee the balance
between generation and the total demand, i.e., to guarantee that g =
∑
i∈P qi. Furthermore, we
assume that the ISO regulates the market by enforcing an average cost price rule, which imposes
some limits on the price charged to customers. This price scheme charges customers an amount
equal to the cost necessary to create the product and it is used to avoid market manipulation
in natural monopolies, such as the electricity system [33]. Average cost pricing is often used
because it is easier to measure compared to the marginal cost, which requires the whole cost
curve. The average cost price function is defined as
p(g) = C(g)/g , (2)
where g represents the total demand and C(g) is the production cost associated with a generation
of g energy units. Using the average cost price scheme, we can express the profit of the ith
agent in Eq. (1) as
Ui(q) = Ui(qi, q−i) = vi(qi)− qip
(∥∥q∥∥
1
)
, (3)
where || · ||1 is the 1-norm.
B. Market Equilibrium
A market equilibrium is reached when the reiterated interaction between buyers and sellers is
in balance. Here, we introduce the equilibrium conditions of both ideal economies and economies
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8with strategic agents, which are used to show the inefficiency of the electricity system in strategic
environments.
1) Optimal Equilibrium: In an ideal market customers behave as price takers and conse-
quently, and their behavior lead to an optimal outcome in the sense of Pareto (i.e., an outcome in
which no individual can made better without making someone else worse off), which maximizes
the aggregate benefit of producers and consumers. Accordingly, the demand profile µ ∈ RN≥0
that maximizes the aggregate surplus is a solution to the following optimization problem:
maximize
q
∑
i∈P
Ui(q)
subject to qi ≥ 0, i = {1, . . . , N}.
(4)
Note that the profit of the producer is zero under an average cost price scheme, therefore, the
aggregate surplus only includes the surplus of consumers.
The following assumptions state that the more an individual consumes, the larger is her
satisfaction. However, each additional unit of satisfaction (or marginal utility) decreases with
each additional unit of consumption. This is known as the diminishing marginal utility property.
Assumption 1.
i. The valuation function vi(·) is differentiable, concave, non-decreasing, and satisfies vi(0) =
0.
ii. The generation cost function can be expressed as C(z) = zp(z), where p(·) is differentiable,
convex, and non-decreasing.
With these assumptions the customer’s surplus is a concave function. This is a necessary
condition by the second theorem of welfare to guarantee that the any Pareto-efficient allocation
can be supported as a competitive equilibrium [34]. The existence of a unique market equilibrium
µ inside the feasible area (i.e., µ belongs to RN≥0) is ensured if the following assumption is
satisfied.
Assumption 2. Let us consider an arbitrary demand profile q˜ such that q˜i = 0 and q˜j ≥ 0 for
any i, j ∈ P such that i 6= j. In this case, the ith user has incentives to increase its demand. In
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9other words, the marginal valuation at q˜i = 0 is greater than the unitary electricity price, i.e.,
∂
∂qi
Ui(q)
∣∣∣∣
q=q˜
=
∂
∂qi
vi(0)− p
(∥∥q˜∥∥
1
)
≥ 0,
for all agent i ∈ P .
Remark 1. These assumptions are reasonable in the context of economic theory [34]. Notice
that Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the problem in Eq. (4) has an optimal µ that satisfies the
following first order conditions (FOC):
∂
∂qi
∑
i∈P
Ui(q)
∣∣∣∣
q=µ
=
∂
∂qi
vi(qi)
− p
(∥∥q∥∥
1
)
−
(∥∥q∥∥
1
) ∂
∂qi
p
(∥∥q∥∥
1
) ∣∣∣∣
q=µ
= 0. (5)
2) Nash Equilibrium: We model the strategic interactions by means of a Cournot game, in
which users select the quantity they want to consume [34], [35]. In the electricity system there is
a conflict between agents, because their actions impose externalities on the society through the
price signals. If the society is finite, then the consumption of each agent might have a significant
impact on the electricity prices and might affect the profit of other agents. Consequently, the
electricity system might be seen as a game in which each agent is selfish and endeavors to
maximize independently its own profit.
The game can be defined as the 3-tuple G = 〈P, (Si)i∈P , (Ui)i∈P〉, where P is the set of
players (or customers), Si = R≥0 is the set of available strategies (consumption of electricity)
of each player, and Ui : S1×· · ·×SN → R is the surplus function of the ith player as a function
of its own actions as well as the strategies of other players. The equilibrium concept used in
game theory is the Nash equilibrium [36], [37]. In particular, the Nash equilibrium of the game
G, denoted by ξ ∈ RN≥0, satisfies
Ui(ξi, ξ−i) ≥ Ui(qi, ξ−i), for all qi ∈ R≥0,
for all agents i ∈ P . The Nash equilibrium ξ is a solution to the following maximization problem
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that every agent i ∈ P attempts to solve independently
maximize
qi
Ui(qi, q−i) = vi(qi)− qip
(∥∥q∥∥
1
)
subject to qi ≥ 0, i = {1, . . . , N}.
(6)
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the Nash equilibrium ξ of the game G satisfies the following
FOC:
∂
∂qi
Ui(qi, q−i)
∣∣∣∣
q=ξ
=
∂
∂qi
vi(qi)
− p
(∥∥q∥∥
1
)
− qi
∂
∂qi
p
(∥∥q∥∥
1
) ∣∣∣∣
q=ξ
= 0, (7)
Furthermore, we can use the results by Rosen [38] to prove that the Nash equilibrium is unique
provided that the strategy space is convex.
Remark 2. The problems described in this section have solution as long as the strategy space
is convex.
C. Electricity System Inefficiency
The degradation of the system’s efficiency due to selfish agents is known as the price of
anarchy [4]. The research in this field has been focused on quantifying the efficiency loss
in specific game environments [6], [8], [9]. In this work, we are interested in the relationship
between the electricity system and the tragedy of the commons [5]. In the tragedy of the commons
the self interest of users lead to an abuse of the resources, even if it is contrary to the interest of
the whole group, because agents have no incentive to individually regulate their consumption.
The reason is that the individual benefit for abusing is greater than its cost, because the cost
is shared by the community. Pitifully, when all individuals abuse the benefit earned by the
community is reduced. The tragedy of the commons can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Tragedy of the commons). At the optimal outcome, every agent has incentives to
consume more resources.
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Now, let us show that the electricity system experiences the tragedy of the commons and the
implications of this fact in the design of demand response programs.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. If µ and ξ are the solutions of
the optimization problems in Eq. (4) and Eq. (6), respectively, then the following conditions are
satisfied:
i. µi ≤ ξi, for all i ∈ P .
ii. The Nash equilibrium ξ is an inefficient outcome in the sense of Pareto.
Hence, the game defined by (U1, . . . , UN) resembles the tragedy of the commons, because i)
every user has incentives to increase its demand; and ii) the self interest leads to an undesired
social outcome.
The proof for this and all other theorems and propositions are given in the Appendix.
Remark 3. Without the average cost price scheme some company might be tempted to induce
inefficient outcomes in the system in order to cause a greater energy demand.
An implication of the tragedy of the commons is that, although there are plenty of resources
and consumption capacity, it is not convenient to over-exploit resources. In particular, the optimal
outcome is characterized by a low consumption with respect to the inefficient outcome. Thus,
the optimal outcome reduces not only the maximum consumption (or peak), but also the overall
consumption. In consequence, using this efficiency criteria in DR schemes might seem counter
intuitive if the objective is to avoid peaks and to flatten the demand, rather than lowering the
total consumption. Hence, the DR objectives might not be fully captured by maximizing the
aggregate surplus (see Eq. (4)).
However, we can use this optimality criteria to alleviate the burden on stressed systems, without
incurring in costs associated with additional generation and transmission capacity. Particularly, by
reducing peaks the supplier can eliminate the most expensive generators that are used to supply
peak demand [39], [40]. The following result gives a boundary of the maximum reduction of
demand that can be achieved in the optimal outcome.
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Theorem 2. The demand of users in the efficient and inefficient systems satisfies
1
2
≤
N + 1
2N
≤
∥∥µ∥∥
1∥∥ξ∥∥
1
≤ 1.
From this result it is clear that for large N the implementation of a DR program can reduce
the total demand in 50%. Particularly, if the peak demand takes place at the same time period
for both the optimal and suboptimal cases, then the peak reduction is at most 50%.
In order to analyze the improvement in the peak-to-average (PAR) with DR we denote ∥∥qk∥∥
1
as the total demand in the kth time interval, with k ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Thus, the PAR of both the
optimal and suboptimal solutions is defined as
PARo =
T
∥∥µkp∥∥
1∑T
k=1
∥∥µk∥∥
1
and PARso =
T
∥∥ξkp∥∥
1∑T
k=1
∥∥ξk∥∥
1
,
respectively. In this case, we assume that the peak consumption is made at the time period kp.
The change in the PAR can be represented by
PARso
PARo
=
∥∥ξkp∥∥
1
/∥∥µkp∥∥
1∑T
k=1
∥∥ξk∥∥
1
/∑T
k=1
∥∥µk∥∥
1
(8)
We can use Theorem 2 to find the maximum improvement in the PAR. For that, let us denote
φk =
∥
∥ξk
∥
∥
1/
∥
∥µk
∥
∥
1
, which satisfies 1 ≤ φk ≤ 2 from Theorem 2. Thus,
∑T
k=1
∥∥ξk∥∥
1
/∑T
k=1
∥∥µk∥∥
1
can be rewritten as
∑T
k=1 φ
k
∥∥µk∥∥
1
/∑T
k=1
∥∥µk∥∥
1
. This expression has the following lower
bound ∑T
k=1
φk
∥∥µk∥∥
1
/∑T
k=1
∥∥µk∥∥
1
≥ min
k
φk, (9)
which can be extracted given that
∑T
k=1 φ
k
∥∥µk∥∥
1
≥
∑T
k=1(mink φ
k)
∥∥µk∥∥
1
holds. Now, Eq. (9)
can be replaced in Eq. (8) to obtain
PARso
PARo
≤
φkp
mink φk
≤ 2.
The rightmost inequality follows because 1 ≤ φk ≤ 2.
If the ratio φk is the same in all time periods, then the PAR has no changes in the optimal
solution, regardless of the peak reduction, i.e., PARso/PARo = 1. On the other hand, the PAR
might be reduced if the ratio φk is smaller for non-peak periods. To illustrate this let us assume
that φkp = r and φk = r − ǫ for k 6= kp, 1 + ǫ ≤ r ≤ 2, and ǫ > 0. Thus, the PAR ratio in Eq.
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(8) can be rewritten as
PARso
PARo
=
r
∑T
k=1
∥∥µk∥∥
1
r
∑T
k=1
∥∥µk∥∥
1
− ǫ
∑
k 6=kp
∥∥µk∥∥
1
> 1.
The PAR can be reduced if the demand reduction of DR is limited by consumption constraints
of customers. For instance, restrictions of the form mi ≤ qi ≤ Mi with µi < mi or Mi < ξi
reduce the ratio between
∥∥µ∥∥
1
and
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
, and might improve the PAR (see Section V).
III. INCENTIVES BASED MECHANISM
Given the unsatisfactory results of the Nash equilibrium in the previous section we are
motivated to design a mechanism to improve the efficiency of the equilibrium in a strategic
environment. In this case, we use mechanism design to find an incentives scheme that guarantees
the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium [12], [34]. First, we introduce mechanism design and
present the general structure of the incentives. Then, we analyze the mechanism as well as
its properties. The results in this section are obtained assuming an affine unitary price function
defined as p(z) = βz+b, since the generation cost can be approximated with a quadratic function
[41].
A. Incentives-Based Mechanism
We assume that individuals in strategic environments are selfish and take actions that maximize
their profits based on both local (or private) and global information. From the perspective of
mechanism design, the rules that govern the payoff structure (and consequently the outcome
of the game) can be designed by an agent, hereinafter called the principal. The principal
might be interested in the achievement of some social goals, such as efficiency according to
a particular criteria. Hence, the principal’s problem consists in designing the game rules that
promote the desired outcome in function of the system characteristics (or economic environment).
The economic environment θ = [θ1, . . . , θN ] is defined in terms of the private information held
by each agent, denoted by θi ∈ Θi, where θi is referred as the type of the ith agent and Θi is the
set of all possible types. The private information θi is relevant to calculate the profit that each
agent receives at a given outcome.
Summarizing, mechanism design consists in designing a solution system to a decentralized
optimization problem with private information [12]. A mechanism Γ = {Σ1, . . . ,ΣN , g(·)}
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defines a set of strategies Σi for each player and an outcome rule g : Σ1 × . . .× ΣN → O that
maps from the set of possible strategies to the set of possible outcomes O [34]. In particular, a
direct revelation mechanism (such as the VCG mechanism [13]–[15]) defines the set of strategies
as the private information of the agents, i.e., Σi = Θi, for all i ∈ P . In such cases, the principal
is in charge of deciding the outcome of the game based on the information sent by the agents.
For example, in voting systems, the strategies are preferences reports made by agents, while the
outcome (the selection of one candidate) might be decided using the Borda rule or plurality with
elimination, among others. Likewise, in auctions the strategies are bids and the outcome (item
allocation and its price) might be decided using a mechanisms such as the second price auction
[20].
We propose an indirect revelation mechanism, which does not require revelation of private
information. The mechanism uses a one-dimensional message space and can be implemented in
a decentralized way (see Section IV). In our setting, the type of an agent is composed by her
consumption preferences. The strategy of each agent is her consumption qi, and consequently,
the set of all possible strategies for the ith agent is defined as Σi ≡ Si = R≥0. In this case, the
set of all possible outcomes O is composed by all the possible electricity prices, i.e., O ≡ R≥0.
Note that the outcome rule g(·) of the mechanism is the price scheme used in the electricity
system. In this case, the mechanism objective is to achieve an optimal demand profile in a
strategic setting, i.e., the Nash equilibrium should be equal to the optimal outcome. To this end,
we modify the price scheme adding an incentive function Ii(·) designed to align the users’ profit
function with the population’s objective function. The incentive function models the externality
imposed by an agent on the rest of the population. The externality is the impact in prices caused
by the participation of a single individual. Thus, the incentives have the form
Ii(q) =
∥∥q−i∥∥1 (hi(q−i)− p (∥∥q∥∥1)) , (10)
where hi(q−i) is a term that estimates the electricity price when the ith user does not take
part in the electricity system. The form of this incentive is related to the price used in the VCG
mechanism [20] and some payoff functions used in potential games [42]. Here, we model hi(q−i)
as
hi(q−i) = p
(∑
j 6=i
qj + f(q−i)
)
, (11)
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where f(q−i) is a function that represents the alternative behavior of the ith agent. In this case,
we consider linear functions of the form
f(q−i) =
∑
j 6=i
ωjqj , (12)
where ωi ∈ R, for all i ∈ P .
Along these lines, with the introduction of this incentives mechanism we obtain a new game
defined as the 3-tuple GI = 〈P, (Σi)i∈P , (Wi)i∈P〉, where P is the set of players, Σi is the set
of available strategies of each player, and Wi : Σ1 × · · · × ΣN → R is the surplus function of
the ith player, which is defined as
Wi(qi, q−i) = Ui(qi, q−i) + Ii(q)
= vi(qi)−
∥∥q∥∥
1
p
(∥∥q∥∥
1
)
+ ||q−i||1hi(q−i). (13)
It can be proved that the Nash equilibrium of the game GI is equal to the optimal equilibrium
µ of the original game G defined in Section II-B2 [21].
B. Mechanism Properties
In mechanisms design it is ideal to satisfy the budget balance property, which states that the
net payments are equal to zero, that is, the sum of charges is equal to the total cost [20]. Let us
define the budget balance as follows.
Definition 2. A mechanism that implements payments ti is budget balanced if
∑
i∈P ti(q) =
C(
∥∥q∥∥
1
).
Note that the original game with the average cost price satisfies the budget balance prop-
erty, because the total payments are equal to the generation cost (see Eq. (2)). However, the
introduction of incentives modifies the amount charged to each costumer, and hence, the budget
balance property changes. Here, we want to determine if it is possible to find some function f(·)
such that the rewards introduced by the incentive function Ii(·) can be found by the benefits
obtained in the optimal outcome. The budget balance condition with incentives implies that∑
i∈P qi p(
∥∥q∥∥
1
) − Ii(q) = C(
∥∥q∥∥
1
). Since p(·) is the average cost price scheme, the budget
balance property is satisfied if
∑
i∈P Ii(q) = 0.
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In the next theorem we prove that the incentives scheme does not satisfy the budget balance
property. That is, the amount of rewards (price discounts) and penalties (price increment) are
not balanced, and consequently, the mechanism requires either inflow or outflow of resources.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Also consider that p(z) = βz + b,
where z ∈ R, β > 0, and b ≥ 0, and a population of two or more agents. Then, there does not
exist a function f(·) of the form in Eq. (12), such that the incentives mechanism described by
Eqs. (10) and (11) satisfies the budget balance property.
This result is an analogous to the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem [43], which
states the impossibility of designing a mechanisms with ex-post efficiency and without exter-
nal subsidies in games between two parties. However, Theorem 3 considers a nonlinear price
scheme and efficiency is defined as the maximization of the aggregate surplus, rather than the
maximization of the aggregate valuation.
Now, since it is not possible to find a budget balanced mechanism, we investigate the design
of a mechanism that satisfies the following fairness conditions.
Condition 1 (Fairness conditions).
i. Incentives for the ith and jth agents are equivalent if their consumption is the same, i.e.,
if qi = qj , then Ii(q) = Ij(q).
ii. If qi = qj for all i, j ∈ P , then Ii(q) = Ij(q) = 0.
iii. A higher power consumption deserves a lower incentive, i.e., if qj > qi, then Ij(q) < Ii(q).
The following result shows the existence of a mechanism that satisfies the fairness conditions
stated above.
Proposition 1. Assume a population with N ≥ 2 agents, incentives defined by Eq. (10) and
(11), and an affine price function p(z) = βz+ b for some β > 0, and b ≥ 0. If the function f(·)
has the form
f(q−i) =
1
N − 1
∑
h 6=i
qh, (14)
for all i ∈ P , then the incentives mechanism satisfies the fairness properties in Condition 1.
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Henceforth, we are going to use the following incentives that satisfy Condition 1:
Ii(q) =
∥∥q−i∥∥1
(
p
(
N
N − 1
∥∥q−i∥∥1
)
− p
(∥∥q∥∥
1
))
. (15)
Therefore, the surplus function in Eq. (13) can be rewritten as
Wi(q) = vi(qi)−
∥∥q∥∥
1
p
(∥∥q∥∥
1
)
+
∥∥q−i∥∥1p
(
N
N − 1
∥∥q−i∥∥1
)
. (16)
Remark 4. Each user only needs the aggregate demand ||q−i||1 to calculate the consumption
qi that maximizes Wi(q). Thus, the mechanism can be implemented using a one-dimensional
message space that communicates the aggregate demand to each user. When considering T time
periods, we can still use a one-dimensional message space if the consumption qki is calculated
sequentially. Otherwise, the implementation might require a T−dimensional message space to
calculate simultaneously the consumption along a day.
With an affine price function the incentives can be rewritten as
Ii(q) = β
(∑
j 6=i
qj
)( 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
qj − qi
)
(17)
for all qi ≥ 0, i, j ∈ P . Thus, the population incentives can be expressed as
∑
i∈P
Ii(q) = βq
⊤Aq, (18)
where A =
(
−1
N−1
ee⊤ + N
N−1
I
)
and e is a vector in RN with all its components equal to 1.
Now, with this expression we can analyze some properties of incentives given by Eq. (17). In the
next proposition we show that the system requires external subsidies to maintain the incentives
scheme. In other words, the mechanism has budget deficit [34].
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Given an incentives mecha-
nism of the form in Eq. (17), then the incentives required by the population are positive, i.e.,∑
i∈P Ii(q) ≥ 0, for all q ∈ RN≥0,
Remark 5. Let us consider an homogeneous population, composed by agents with equal pref-
erences. In such population, the energy consumed at the equilibrium is the same for every
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agent. Thus, according to Condition 1, a homogeneous population requires null incentives at
the equilibrium. In particular, incentives would be required only to shift the system from an
inefficient outcome toward the optimal equilibrium.
It is possible to design incentive functions that lead to systems with budget surplus (revenues
are higher than expenses). For example, [44] shows an alternative incentive function that entails
higher electricity prices and specifically, does not satisfies ii) in Condition 1, because the
incentives are negative even when all users have equal demand.
Now, using Proposition 2 we can prove that the aggregate surplus reached in the Nash
equilibrium with incentives is equal to the aggregate surplus of the optimal solution µ.
Proposition 3. Consider a population of agents with surplus function of the form in Eq. (3) and
incentives described by Eq. (10). Also, consider that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then,
the aggregate surplus with the mechanism is equal to the maximum aggregate surplus of the
initial game G, i.e.,
∑
i∈PWi(µ)− Ii(µ) =
∑
i∈P Ui(µ) >
∑
i∈P Ui(ξ).
Next, we prove that the incentives mechanism is individual rational. A mechanism is individual
rational if agents voluntarily accept the rules imposed by the mechanism. Formally, a mechanism
is individual rationality if the benefit obtained by any agent i ∈ P with the mechanism is greater
than the benefit of not participating, which is assumed to be zero.
Theorem 4. The mechanisms with incentives in Eq. (15) is individual rational, that is, Wi(µi,µ−i) ≥
0, for all µ.
So far, we have verified that in a strategic environment the aggregate surplus is optimal with
the adoption of incentives (see Proposition 3). Also, the mechanism guarantees that the surplus of
an individual is always positive. However, an individual that is enrolled in an inefficient system
might migrate toward a system that implements incentives only if its profit is not be reduced
after the change. The following result guarantees that the agents that have a lower consumption
with respect to the average can expect a greater surplus in the system with incentives.
Theorem 5. Every agent that consumes less resources than the average in the optimal outcome
of the game G can expect a greater profit in the Nash equilibrium of the game with incentives
GI . That is, if µi < 1N
∑
h∈P µh, then Ui(µ) < Wi(µ). Otherwise, Ui(µ) ≥Wi(µ).
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Fig. 1: Decentralized implementation of the mechanism. Each agent must compute its optimal
consumption profile qi in function of the aggregate consumption profile g.
Theorem 5 shows that some users can expect a higher surplus in the system with incentives
(GI). This happens because the low consumption is rewarded in GI . The extent to which an
agent can expect major surplus in GI , with respect to the inefficient outcome ξ is an open
problem.
In summary, a careful design of the incentives properties is necessary to encourage the adoption
of the mechanism. For instance, we know that customers would join the DR program because it
guarantees positive surplus (see Theorem 4). Furthermore, if it is their choice, some customers
would prefer a program with incentives (see Theorem 5). These properties can be assured partly
because the mechanism has budget deficit. On the contrary, if the mechanism is weak budget
balanced, then customers would have to face higher taxes.
IV. DECENTRALIZED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MECHANISM
In previous sections we have analyzed the characteristics of the electricity system market
at different equilibrium points. In this section we are concerned with the behavioral modeling
(dynamics) of rational individuals that are involved in a game. Particularly, we show that the
Nash equilibrium can be learned in a decentralized manner.
Let us modify the notation used in previous sections to allow multiple time periods. We
divide a period of 24 hours into T disjoint time intervals, denoted by π1, . . . , πT , that satisfy
∪k∈{1,...,T}πk = [0, 24) and ∩k∈{1,...,T}πk = ∅. The consumption of the ith customer in the kth
time interval is denoted by qki . Thus, the daily consumption profile of a customer is represented
with the vector qi = [q1i , . . . , qTi ]⊤ ∈ RT≥0. Likewise, the electricity consumption of the population
is denoted by the vector q = [q⊤1 , . . . , q⊤N ]⊤ ∈ RT ·N≥0 , and the vector qk = [qk1 , . . . , qkN ]⊤ represents
the electricity consumption of all customers at the kth time interval. On the other hand, the
vectors q−i = [q
⊤
1 , . . . , q
⊤
i−1, q
⊤
i+1, . . . , q
⊤
N ]
⊤ ∈ R
T ·(N−1)
≥0 and qk−i = [qk1 , . . . , qki−1, qki+1, . . . , qkN ]⊤
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represent the consumption of the population without the ith agent during a day or during the kth
time period, respectively. The valuation function vki : R≥0 → R represents the economic value
that the ith user assigns to qki electricity units in the kth time interval.
We propose an indirect revelation mechanism that allows each customer to use the resources
without any restriction. In this way it distributes the computation tasks among the population.
Specifically, each individual is responsible for optimizing its own consumption based on the total
demand of the society, that can be broadcasted by the electric utility (see Fig. 1).
We can think on automation devices that optimize the energy consumption (following some
dynamics), based on particular preferences (local information) and reports from the central entity.
Therefore, we assume that each customer’s automation device carries out a learning process to
adjust its consumption to the price signals sent by the electric utility. In other words, the learning
process solves a resource allocation problem, in which each individual finds the amount of
resources that should be used in a given time period. Here, we assume that the daily consumption
of each user is bounded by Qi, which can be interpreted as the maximum consumption capacity
of the ith customer. Let us generalize the surplus function with incentives in Eq. (13) as
Wi(qi, q−i) =
∑T
k=1
(
vki (q
k
i )−
∥∥qk∥∥
1
p
(∥∥qk∥∥
1
)
+ ∥∥qk−i∥∥1 hi(qk−i))
Accordingly, the optimization problem that customer agent solves (see Eqs. (6) and (16)) can
be rewritten as
maximize
qi
Wi(qi, q−i)
subject to
∑T
k=1
qki ≤ Qi
qki ≥ 0, i = {1, . . . , N}, k = {1, . . . , T}.
(19)
If Qi is large enough, we can assure that the solution to the optimization problems in (6) and (19)
is the same. This formulation is convenient to define the fitness and strategies in the population
game defined below. Now, let us introduce some notation to be consistent with the literature in
population games [27].
Remark 6. This model does not has into account other factors that impact the satisfaction
of users, such as quality (e.g., continuity of the service, variation in voltage), reliability, and
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security of the service. The regulation made by the ISO encourages high quality of service
through economic incentives, and therefore imposes additional restriction on the electric utility
(which are not considered here). We refer the reader interested in security aspects to [45], where
it is shown that this decentralized scheme might be more resilient to fraud and malicious attacks
than centralized schemes (such as direct load control).
A. Population Games Approach
In this case, we assume that each user implements some evolutionary dynamics to maxi-
mize her own surplus (see problem in Eq. (19)). Thus, the electricity game can be seen as a
multi-population game, in which each customer represents a population in the society P . The
evolutionary dynamics are differential equations that describe changes in the strategies adopted
in the population (in this case the demand along the day). The population dynamics approach
can be used to solve optimization problems with restrictions, as it is shown in [46].
Let us formulate the population game as follows. We consider a society composed by N
populations with T +1 possible strategies per each population. For a given population i, the kth
strategy’s expected value is denoted by qki , for k ∈ {1, . . . , T}, i.e., the population’s strategy is
the amount of resources consumed in each time period. Moreover, the strategy qT+1i is a slack
variable that represents the power not consumed in any time interval and it is modeled as a
consumption in the fictitious (T + 1)th time interval. The slack variable is defined as
qT+1i = Qi −
∑T
k=1
qki .
Now, let us define the fitness (or payoff) function F ik : RN → R for the kth strategy in the
ith population as the derivative of the surplus function Wi(q), i.e., the fitness is equal to the
marginal surplus of the ith population, defined as
F ik(q
k) =
∂Wi
∂qki
(qk), (20)
for k ∈ {1, . . . , T}. On the other hand, the fitness of the fictitious variable (consumption in
k = T + 1) is defined as zero, i.e., F iT+1 = 0. The election of these fitness functions guarantees
that the population game is a potential game. Potential games are a class of population games
that can be solved using multiple dynamics [27].
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Proposition 4. The proposed population game is a potential game with potential function Ψ (q) =∑
i∈P Ui(qi, q−i).
In this case, we use the definition of potential games for continuous sets of strategies defined
in [27]. Specifically, a population game with fitness functions F ik is potential game if there exist
a function Ψ such that
∂Ψ
∂qki
(q) = F ik(q
k).
The main property of potential games is that the Nash equilibria of the game is characterized by
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker first order necessary conditions of the potential function. This implies
that the incentives of all players are mapped into one function and the set of pure Nash equilibria
can be found by locating the local optima of the potential function.
The dynamics are built assuming myopic behavior, hence, the decisions are made using past
information of the aggregated demand. For instance, users choose the future consumption at a
particular time period based on the consumption from the day before. However, the updates for
the whole day must be calculated at the same time, because the dynamics couple different time
periods.
B. Evolutionary Dynamics
We implement four evolutionary dynamics, namely logit dynamics (Logit), replicator dynamics
(RD), Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics (BNN), and Smith dynamics, which belongs to the
family of perturbed optimization, imitative dynamics, excess payoff dynamics, and pairwise
comparison dynamics [27], [47]. The following differential equation describe the evolution in
time of each strategy
1) Logit Dynamics:
x˙ik =
exp (η−1F ik(x))∑
γ∈S exp
(
η−1F iγ(x)
) , η > 0,
2) Replicator Dynamics:
x˙ik = x
i
k Fˆ
i
k (x) . (21)
3) Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics (BNN):
x˙ik =
[
Fˆ ik (x)
]
+
− xik
∑
γ∈S
[
Fˆ iγ (x)
]
+
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4) Smith Dynamics:
x˙ik =
∑
γ∈S
xiγ
[
F ik (x)− F
i
γ (x)
]
+
− xik
∑
γ∈S
[
F iγ(x)− F
i
k(x)
]
+
. (22)
This dynamic is defined in function of the excess payoff to strategy k as Fˆ ik = F ik(qk)−F¯ ik(qk),
where F¯ ik(qk) is the average payoff the population i. Since the potential function Ψ (·) is a concave
function, we know that the population game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which corresponds
to the maximum of Ψ . The dynamics in Eq. (22) satisfies the positive correlation (PC) property.
Hence, according to Lemma 7.1.1 [27], Ψ is a Lyapunov function for the differential equation and
it can be shown that the Nash equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable with Smith dynamics.
Moreover, Replicator dynamics is locally stable because it does not necessarily converge to the
Nash equilibrium. In particular, the solutions to (21) might not reach the Nash equilibrium if
the initial conditions are in the border of the simplex X i (replicator admits solutions/rest points
that are not NE as well as closed orbits). Analogous convergence results can be derived for the
perturbed best response (logit) dynamics.
It is important to highlight that in this implementation we use two different time domains.
On the one hand, we represent a daily time domain by means of k ∈ {1, . . . , T}. This time
domain is discrete and represents different time intervals during a day. On the other hand,
the evolutionary dynamics introduce a continuous time domain related to the evolution of the
differential equations. The scale of this continuous time domain can be considered much larger
than the daily time domain, since adjustments in the consumption are considered to be slow.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate some ideas of efficiency and the decentralized implementation of
the incentives mechanism. Part of the simulations are available at [48]. In these experiments
we select some functions used previously in the literature that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2 (see
[30], [49]). On the one hand, we define the valuation functions as
vki (q
k
i ) = α
k
i log(1 + q
k
i )
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where αki > 0 is the parameter that characterizes the valuation of the ith agent at the kth time
instant. On the other hand, the generation cost function is defined as
C(‖q‖1) = β(‖q‖1)
2,
and the unitary price function is
p(‖q‖1) =
C(‖q‖1)
‖q‖1
= β‖q‖1.
For simplicity, the generation cost only depends on the aggregate consumption, not on the time
of the day. Furthermore, the fitness function of the system with incentives (see Eq. (20)) is
F ik(q
k) =
αki
1 + qki
− 2β
(∑
j∈P
qkj
)
.
We define N = 5 users, Qi = 30KWh for all i, β = 1, T = 24, and random initial conditions
that satisfy
∑T+1
k=1 x
i
k(0) = Qi. In order to model time varying valuations along a day, we assign
to αki a value proportional to the actual consumption in an electrical system. In this case, we
use the consumption measurements provided by the Colombian electricity system administrator
to choose αki proportional to the total demand during the kth time period [50]. We define a
heterogeneous society composed by individuals with different valuations, such that
αki < α
k
j ,
for all i, j ∈ P with i < j and k ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Thus, the ith user has lower preferences, at any
time interval, than the i+ 1th user.
A. Inefficiency Example
In Fig. 2 we show the social surplus and the total demand of the optimal and suboptimal
solutions of the game G (without incentives). We verify that the population’s demand is lower at
the optimal solution. Also, Fig. 2 shows that the surplus of the society is greater at the optimal
outcome. These properties are characteristics of the tragedy of the commons.
Now we are interested in finding the relation between the optimal and suboptimal solutions as
a function of the number of customers N . Fig. 3 shows the change in both demand and surplus
of the optimal solution with respect to the suboptimal case for the peak hour, which takes place
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Fig. 2: Social surplus and total demand in both optimal and suboptimal solutions.
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(a) Quotient of the total demand in the optimal and
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(b) Quotient of the social surplus in the optimal and
suboptimal solutions.
Fig. 3: Relation of the total demand and the social surplus in both the optimal and suboptimal
solutions.
at the same time in both solutions. As N grows the ratio
∥
∥µk
∥
∥
1/
∥
∥ξk
∥
∥
1
approaches 1/2. In other
words, the optimal demand is at least a half of the suboptimal demand. Moreover, the quotient of
the social surplus in the optimal and suboptimal solutions increases with N . The efficiency loss
boundary presented in [7] does not apply here because we use the average cost price scheme,
rather than marginal cost price.
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Fig. 4: PAR improvement reached when considering restrictions of the form mi ≤ qki with
different values of mi.
Recall from Section II that the ratio
∥
∥µk
∥
∥
1/
∥
∥ξk
∥
∥
1
might be affected by restrictions of the form
mi ≤ q
k
i ≤ Mi. Here we variate mi to observe the change in the PAR ratio from Eq. (8). Fig.
4 shows that the the PAR ratio improves if mink
∥∥µk∥∥
1
≤ mi ≤ maxk
∥∥µk∥∥
1
, because in this
case the PAR of the optimal solution is reduced, while the PAR of the sob-optimal solution is
the same. However, if mi ≥ mink
∥∥ξk∥∥
1
then the PAR ratio decreases, because the restriction
affects the sub-optimal solution and reduces its PAR.
Now, let us analyze the ideas related with the dynamical systems. In order to the analyze the
response of the population to the economic incentives, we introduce incentives in the time period
contained between 2 and 4 seconds (see Fig. 5). The introduction of the incentives produces
an increment in population average utility, as well as a reduction in the average consumption.
Also, note that the total incentives delivered to the heterogeneous population are different from
zero.
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Fig. 5: Dynamics of a heterogeneous population with incentives using BNN dynamics.
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Fig. 6 shows the incentive given to each user in the optimal equilibrium. Note that the user
with a lower valuation (user 1) is the one that receives more incentives, while the user with larger
valuations (user 5) has the lower incentives. This happens because the user with lower valuations
can reduce its consumption much more than a user with higher valuations, and consequently,
receives more incentives.
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Fig. 6: Incentives of a heterogeneous population at the optimal equilibrium.
B. Evolutionary Dynamics
Now, let us analyze the ideas related with the dynamical systems. The evolution of social
surplus, demand, and incentives for different dynamics are shown in Figs. 7 and 8. Note that
despite using the same initial condition, the evolution of the system is different with each
dynamical model. In particular, BNN and Smith dynamics converge faster to the optimum.
This is achieved by means of a fast decrease in the power consumption.
Incentives in Fig. 8 show that, in the long run, all dynamics converge to the same level of
incentives. Particularly, Smith dynamics requires more incentives during all time, except for logit
dynamics, which has a sudden increase in the incentives close to the equilibrium point.
In Fig. 8 it is not clear which dynamical model moves the state of the system to the optimal
equilibrium using less resources. To answer this question, we simulate the total amount of
incentives used by each model. Thus, let us define the aggregate incentives in a society in a
particular time t as
Id(t) =
∑
i∈P
1
|S|
∑
k∈S
Ii
(
qk(t)
)
.
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Fig. 7: Evolution of the society’s daily average surplus and power consumption.
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Fig. 8: Evolution of the incentives with four different dynamics.
Now, the total accumulated incentives from t0 to t is defined as
Φd(t) =
∫ t
t0
Id(τ)dτ.
Thus, Φd(t) gives a measurement of the total amount subsidies required by the system with
dynamic d, in the time interval [t0, t]. In this case we do not have a reference to compare
the subsidies requirements of each evolutionary dynamic. Hence, we compare the subsidies
requirements with the average requirements of all the dynamics implemented. In order to see
which dynamic requires more resources, we plot the cumulative resources required by each
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Fig. 9: Accumulated incentives during the evolution of the algorithm.
dynamic relative to the average. Hence, we define the cumulative incentives as
CId =
Φd(t)∑
d∈D Φd(t)
.
Fig. 9 shows the results of the simulation of the relative subsidies required by each model of
evolutionary dynamics. Smith and BNN dynamics require less resources, while logit has the
higher requires higher incentives. However, BNN has the lower incentives in long run.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper we propose an indirect revelation mechanism to maximize the aggregate surplus of
the population. The main feature of this mechanism is that it does not require private information
from users, and employs a one-dimensional message space per resource to be allocated. These
properties facilitate the distributed implementation of the mechanism. The mechanism entrusts
the computation tasks among users, who should maximize its own surplus function based the
aggregate demand (that is calculated and broadcasted by a central agent). Thus, users avoid
revelation of private information (e.g., preferences), but are required to report the aggregate
consumption of their appliances during some time periods.
We show that most users of the electricity system would join the incentives program vol-
untarily, since they might have positive surplus. Particularly, users that consume less resources
than the average can expect a higher surplus in the system with incentives, because the low
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consumption is rewarded in GI . However, the extent to which an agent can expect major surplus
in GI , with respect to the inefficient outcome ξ is an open problem. The mechanism has budget
deficit and might require external subsidies to succeed. In particular, the implementation cost
of the mechanism depends on preferences and dynamics implemented by users.
We introduce an approach based on evolutionary dynamics that might be used by each user
to find the demand profile that maximizes its surplus. Particularly, when implemented locally
by each user, the evolutionary dynamics lead to the global efficient equilibrium. We implement
four popular evolutionary dynamics, namely logit dynamics, replicator dynamics, Brown-von
Neumann-Nash dynamics, and Smith dynamics. We find that the system might converge faster
to the equilibrium with Smith and BNN dynamics. Also, BNN dynamics has a relatively fast
convergence and uses less resources in the long run.
Future work will be focused on analyzing the characteristics of the mechanism on large
populations. Also, it is interesting to explore different dynamics that lead to minimum accumu-
lated incentives, as well as possible applications of fast dynamics in environments with random
components, such as renewable generation.
A. Limitations
We do not consider time interdependencies of the electricity usage. Also, we assume that
the customers can choose a continuous electricity usage. However, appliances have discrete
consumption and additional operation constraints. This model does not has into account other
factors that impact the satisfaction of users, such as quality (e.g., continuity of the service,
variation in voltage), reliability, and security of the service.
The implementation might have a slow convergence because we omit the negotiation phase
to preserve privacy. This might limit the use of renewable generation.
VII. APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of numeral (i) is made by contradiction. Let us assume that there
exist some agent j ∈ P such that µj > ξj . From Eq. (7) we know that the Nash equilibrium ξ
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satisfies the following FOC:
∂
∂qj
Uj(q)
∣∣∣
q=ξ
= v˙j(ξj)− p(
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
)− ξj p˙(
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
) = 0. (23)
On the other hand, our initial hypothesis implies that at the Nash equilibrium ξ the jth user has
incentives to increase its consumption, that is,
∂
∂qj
∑
i∈P
Ui(q)
∣∣∣
q=ξ
= v˙j(ξj)− p(
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
)
−
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
p˙(
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
) > 0. (24)
Replacing Eq. (23) into Eq. (24) we obtain
−
∥∥ξ−j∥∥1p˙(∥∥ξ∥∥1) > 0. (25)
Note that with Assumption 2 we guarantee that µi ≥ 0 and ξi ≥ 0, for all agent i ∈ P . Hence,
from Eq. (25) we conclude that p˙(
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
) < 0. However, from Assumption 1 we know that the
unitary price function p(·) is an increasing function. Hence, p˙(
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
) is positive or equal to zero.
This leads to a contradiction, showing that µj ≤ ξj , for all j ∈ P .
Now, the proof of numeral (ii) is made by direct proof. With Assumption 1 we guarantee
that the competitive equilibrium is unique, and corresponds to the best possible outcome for the
population. Hence, the competitive equilibrium is efficient in the sense of Pareto. On the other
hand, from numeral (i) we conclude that ‖µ‖1 < ‖ξ‖1. Therefore, ξ 6= µ, which implies that
the total consumption at the Nash equilibrium ξ is not efficient in the sense of Pareto.
Since users have incentives to consume more resources, and this leads to a suboptimal outcome,
we conclude that the electricity system model resembles the tragedy of the commons.
Proof of Theorem 2. From Theorem 1 we know that ∥∥µ∥∥
1
≤
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
. Therefore,
∥
∥µ
∥
∥
1/
∥
∥ξ
∥
∥
1
≤ 1.
Also, µi ≤ ξi. implies that v˙i(µi) ≥ v˙i(ξi), since v˙i(·) is concave and increasing. From the FOC
in Eq. (5) and Eq. (7) we deduce that
p
(∥∥ξ∥∥
1
)
+ ξi p˙
(∥∥ξ∥∥
1
)
≤ p
(∥∥µ∥∥
1
)
+
∥∥µ∥∥
1
p˙
(∥∥µ∥∥
1
)
. (26)
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On the other hand, we can use the convexity of the price function to show that
p
(∥∥µ∥∥
1
)
+
(∥∥ξ∥∥
1
−
∥∥µ∥∥
1
)
p˙
(∥∥µ∥∥
1
)
≤ p
(∥∥ξ∥∥
1
)
. (27)
We can use Eq. (26) and (27) to obtain
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
p˙
(∥∥µ∥∥
1
)
+ ξi p˙
(∥∥ξ∥∥
1
)
≤ 2
∥∥µ∥∥
1
p˙
(∥∥µ∥∥
1
) (28)
Recall that p˙(·) is increasing, and it follows that p˙
(∥∥ξ∥∥
1
)
≥ p˙
(∥∥µ∥∥
1
)
, which can be replaced
in Eq. (28) to obtain ∥∥ξ∥∥
1
+ ξi ≤ 2
∥∥µ∥∥
1
. (29)
Note that this expression is true for all i, because from Theorem 1 we know that µi ≤ ξi. Hence,
we can sum Eq. (29) for all individuals in the population to obtain
(N + 1)
∥∥ξ∥∥
1
≤ 2N
∥∥µ∥∥
1
,
which leads to the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 3. This proof is made by contradiction. First, we assume that there exist a
function f(·) such that the mechanism is budget balanced, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 Ii(q) = 0. Now, we express
the incentives in matrix form. On that purpose, we first define [f(q−1), . . . , f(q−N)]⊤ = Fq,
as a vector with the ith element equal to f(q−i). In particular, F = (eω⊤ − diag(ω1, . . . , ωN)),
ω = [ω1, . . . , ωN ]
⊤
, diag(ω1, . . . , ωN) is a diagonal matrix, and e is a vector in RN with all its
components equal to 1.
Since p(·) is an affine function, Eq. (10) can be expressed as∑Ni=1 Ii(q) = β∑Ni=1 (∑Nj 6=i qj)(f(q−i)−
qi
)
. This can be rewritten in matrix form as
∑N
i=1 Ii(q) = βq
⊤Φ(Fq−q), where Φ = (ee⊤−I)
and I is the identity matrix in RN×N .
Now, considering the budget balance condition, we have q⊤ΦFq = q⊤Φq. This equation is
satisfied if either qi = 0 for all i ∈ P , or if F = I . Note that F is a matrix with zeros in the
diagonal, therefore, F 6= I . Accordingly, none of the previous conditions are satisfied for all
vector q ∈ RN≥0. Consequently, we conclude that the budget balance property cannot be achieved
with the incentives mechanism described by Eq. (10), (11), and (12).
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Proof of Proposition 1. Let us consider an arbitrary consumption profile qˆ in RN≥0 such that
qˆi = qˆj , for some i, j ∈ P . Since the average cost price signal is an affine function, the
incentives function in Eq. (10) can be rewritten as Ii(qˆ) = β
(∑
h 6=i qˆj
)(
f(qˆ−i) − qˆi
)
. If we
use an incentives scheme with f(·) defined by Eq. (14), then the incentives assigned to the ith
and jth agent are
Ii(qˆ) = β
(∑
h 6=i
qˆh
)( 1
N − 1
∑
h 6=i
qˆh − qˆi
)
, (30)
Ij(qˆ) = β
(∑
h 6=j
qˆh
)( 1
N − 1
∑
h 6=j
qˆh − qˆj
)
. (31)
Since qˆi = qˆj , then
∑
h 6=i qˆh =
∑
h 6=j qˆh. Hence, Ii(qˆ) = Ij(qˆ) and condition (i) is satisfied.
Now, if the consumption profile qˆ satisfies qˆi = qˆj = σ for all i, j ∈ P , then
Ii(qˆ) = β ((N − 1)σ)
(
N − 1
N − 1
σ − σ
)
= 0.
Consequently, condition (ii) is satisfied.
Finally, let us consider an arbitrary vector qˆ such that qˆi > qˆj for some i, j ∈ P . Then we
know that ∑
h 6=i
qˆh <
∑
h 6=j
qˆh. (32)
Furthermore, 1
N−1
∑
h 6=i qˆh + qˆj <
1
N−1
∑
h 6=j qˆh + qˆi, that can be rewritten as
1
N − 1
∑
h 6=i
qˆh − qˆi <
1
N − 1
∑
h 6=j
qˆh − qˆj. (33)
Inequalities in Eq. (32) and (33) can be used with Eq. (30) and (31) to show that Ii(qˆ) < Ij(qˆ).
Hence, property (iii) is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, consider q2i + q2j − 2qiqj = (qi − qj)2 ≥ 0 for all qi ∈ RT≥0.
Hence, we have that q2i + q2j ≥ 2qiqj . Now, summing in both sides of the previous equation
we obtain
∑
i∈P
∑
j 6=i(q
2
i + q
2
j ) ≥
∑
i∈P
∑
j 6=i 2qiqj , which is equivalent to (N − 1)
∑
i∈P q
2
i ≥∑
i∈P
∑
j 6=i 2qiqj . Reordering results
∑
i∈P
q2i ≥
2
N − 1
∑
i∈P
∑
j 6=i
qiqj . (34)
Now, let Aj,i = −1N−1 if i 6= j and Ai,i = 1 for all i, j ∈ P . Therefore, the incentives in Eq. (18)
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can be expressed as βq⊤Aq = β
∑
i∈P qj
(∑
j∈P qjAj,i
)
. This can be rewritten as
βq⊤Aq = β
(∑
i∈P
q2i +
−1
N − 1
∑
i∈P
qj
(∑
j 6=i
qj
))
.
From Eq. (34), it can be seen that q⊤Aq ≥ 0, for all q ∈ RN≥0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall from Theorem 1 that the aggregate surplus at the optimal outcome
µ is greater than aggregate surplus at the Nash equilibrium ξ, that is
∑
i∈P Ui(µ) >
∑
i∈P Ui(ξ).
Also, recall that the system with incentives achieves the optimum outcome, then the aggregate
surplus of the system with incentives is
∑
i∈P Wi(µ) =
∑
i∈P (Ui(µ) + Ii(µ)).
If we assume that the incentives are founded by the ISO, then the aggregate surplus with the
mechanism is ∑
i∈P
Wi(µ)− Ii(µ) =
∑
i∈P
Ui(µ) >
∑
i∈P
Ui(ξ).
Consequently, the aggregate surplus with the mechanism is equal to the aggregate surplus of the
optimal equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let us consider a consumption profile in which the ith individual is not
consuming energy, i.e., q such that qi = 0 for some i ∈ P . Note that
∥∥q∥∥
1
= 0+
∥∥q−i∥∥1. Hence,
from Eq. (16) we have that the surplus with incentives is equal to
Wi(qi = 0, q−i) = vi(0)+ ∥∥q−i∥∥1
(
p
(
N
N − 1
∥∥q−i∥∥1
)
− p
(∥∥q−i∥∥1)
)
Since the price function is increasing, we know that p
(
N
N−1
∥∥q−i∥∥1) ≥ p (∥∥q−i∥∥1). Consequently,
the surplus function of every agent i is greater or equal than zero.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let us rewrite the surplus of the ith agent (see Eq. (3)) at the equilibrium
as
Ui(µ) = vi(µi)−
∥∥µ∥∥
1
p(
∥∥µ∥∥
1
) +
∥∥µ−i∥∥1p(∥∥µ∥∥1).
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If we evaluate the surplus with incentives (see Eq. (16)) in the Pareto optimal outcome µ, we
can find that
Wi(µ)− Ui(µ) = ∥∥µ−i∥∥1
(
p
(
1
N − 1
∥∥µ−i∥∥1 + ∥∥µ−i∥∥1
)
− p(
∥∥µ∥∥
1
)
)
.
Now, if µi < 1N−1
∑
h 6=i µh ( that can be rewritten as µi < 1N
∑
h∈P µh), then 1N−1
∥∥µ−i∥∥1 +∥∥µ−i∥∥1 > ∥∥µ∥∥1 and consequently Wi(µ)− Ui(µ) > 0.
On the other hand, if µi ≥ 1N−1
∑
h 6=i µh (that can be rewritten as µi ≥ 1N
∑
h∈P µh), then
1
N−1
∥∥µ−i∥∥1 + ∥∥µ−i∥∥1 ≤ ∥∥µ∥∥1 and thus Wi(µ)− Ui(µ) ≤ 0.
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